Kida Lin

Corpus Christi College, Oxford
Merton St
Oxford, OX1 4JF
United Kingdom
kida.lin@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
https://www.kidalin.com/

1. Research Interests

AOS: Ethics, political philosophy
AOC: Philosophy of law

2. Academic Positions

University College, University of Oxford, UK
Non-stipendiary Lecturer (Jan 2024 – Jun 2024)

Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford, UK
Non-stipendiary Lecturer (Sep 2023 – Jun 2024)

Lincoln College, University of Oxford, UK
Non-stipendiary Lecturer (Apr 2023 – Dec 2023)

3. Education

Primary

University of Oxford (Corpus Christi College), UK
DPhil in Philosophy (Oct 2022 – exp. Nov 2026)
Thesis: *Give Peace a Chance: Essays on Pacifism*
Submitted Oct 2026; viva scheduled Nov 2026
Examiners: Victor Tadros and Jonathan Quong
Advisors: Alex Kaiserman, Sandy Steel, and Jeff McMahan

University of Oxford (Somerville College), UK
BPhil in Philosophy (Oct 2020 – Jun 2022)
Thesis: *Rethinking War and Defence*
Advisor: Jeff McMahan

AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, AUSTRALIA

BA (Hons) in Philosophy (Jul 2018 – Oct 2019)

Advisor: Seth Lazar

UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA

BA in Philosophy; Government and International Relations

(Feb 2016 – Jun 2018)

Visiting

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, USA

Recognised Visiting Student (Sep 2025 – Dec 2025)

Advisors: Michael Otsuka and Alec Walen

UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK, UK

Recognised Visiting Student (Jan 2023 – Mar 2023)

Advisors: Victor Tadros and Patrick Tomlin

4. MANUSCRIPTS IN PROGRESS

(4) The Myth of the "Just" War

Abstract. Plausibly, a just war is one that satisfies all the conditions of *jus ad bellum*. I argue that *jus ad bellum* requires not only the satisfaction of proportionality and necessity, but also that of the right intention constraint. I defend a conception of the right intention constraint—Intention Matters Independently—according to which a defensive act is just only if the agent, unless fully excused, (1) does not act with any wrongful intention and (2) intends to achieve all the just causes. It follows, I argue, that most realistic wars are unjust, that states typically ought not, evidence-relatively, to wage wars, and that a third party often ought not to help even the side with a just cause.

(3) Requirements and Coercion in War

Abstract. Suppose that 1,000 innocent people will be killed by a runaway trolley unless Y diverts it onto a side track where it will kill X. Y announces that he does not plan to intervene. Z then coerces Y to do so—she credibly threatens that, unless he does, she will break both his arms. I argue that (1) X would not, if the choice were hers, be required to divert the trolley towards herself; (2) because of (1), Y is not required to divert the trolley towards X; and (3) because of (2), Z is not permitted to coerce Y to divert the trolley. I then consider this argument's implications for war. I argue that just combatants are the moral equivalents of Y; just decision-makers are the moral equivalents of Z; and the innocent people whom just combatants will inevitably kill if they fight in war are the moral equivalents of X. The takeaway, I shall show, is a plausible form of *ad bellum* pacifism.

(2) **Minor Torturers and Wrongful Killings in War**

Abstract. Most killings in war are wrongful. Drawing on a novel puzzle—the Puzzle of Minor Torturers—I argue that such killings violate either proportionality or necessity. While there can be killings that satisfy both proportionality and necessity—this depends in part on adopting a particular conception of how we apply the two moral constraints—we ought, evidence-relatively, not to kill. Specifically, I defend the Knowledge Requirement on Permissible Killing: if we know that our act involves killing, the act is evidence-relatively permissible if and only if we know that it satisfies both evidence-relative proportionality and evidence-relative necessity. The upshot, I shall show, is a plausible form of *in bello* pacifism.

(1) **A paper on suboptimal supererogation (under review)**

5. PRESENTATIONS

Talks

(36) "Requirements and Coercion in War", comments by Saba Bazargan-Forward, Early Career Workshop, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (May 2026)

(35) "Requirements and Coercion in War", Papers in Progress Workshop, Eastern Division Meeting, American Philosophical Association (Jan 2026)

(34) "Minor Torturers and Wrongful Killings in War", Eastern Division Meeting, American Philosophical Association (Jan 2026)

(33) "Minor Torturers and Wrongful Killings in War", Value Theory Discussion Group, Rutgers University (Oct 2025)

(32) "Minor Torturers and Wrongful Killings in War", Philosophy, Ethics, and Killing Workshop (Jul 2025)

(31) "When is Suboptimal Supererogation Wrong?", Annual Conference, Society for Applied Philosophy (Jun 2025)

(30) "Requirements and Coercion in War", Lateran Graduate Conference, Promoting Peace: Philosophy, Theology, and Peace Studies, Pontifical Lateran University (Jun 2025)

(29) "Requirements and Coercion in War", comments by Max Klinger, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Jun 2025)

(28) "Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War", comments by Cécile Fabre, DPhil Seminar in Philosophy, University of Oxford (May 2025)

(27) "Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War", Symposium, Political, Legal, and Moral Philosophy Research Group, Central European University (May 2025)

(26) "Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War", comments by Xihe Ouyang, Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Calgary (May 2025)

(25) "Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War", International Graduate Conference, National University of Ireland, Galway (Apr 2025)

(24) "Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War", Work-in-Progress Talk, Corpus Christi College Philosophy Society, University of Oxford (Mar 2025)

(23) "Minor Threateners and Wrongful Killings in War", Nuffield Political Theory Workshop, University of Oxford (Mar 2025)

(22) "On Bearing a Supererogatory Cost to Do the Lesser Good", comments by Padraig Cuffe, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Nov 2023)

(21) "Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible", Philosophy, Ethics, and Killing Workshop (Jul 2023)

(20) "Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and Rights Infringements", Joint Session, Aristotelian Society and Mind Association (Jul 2023)

(19) "Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and Rights Infringements", Annual Conference, Society for Applied Philosophy (Jun 2023)

(18) "Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and Rights Infringements", Just War Theory Workshop, University of Warwick (Jan 2023)

(17) "Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, the Transfer of Prerogatives, and Moral Interests", Graduate Conference in Analytic Philosophy, Beijing Normal University (Jan 2023) ***Best Paper Award***

(16) "Why Turning the Trolley is Merely Permissible: Lesser-Evil Options, Agent-Favouring Options, and the Moral Interest in Refraining from Killing", comments by Brian Wong, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Jan 2023)

(15) "Lesser-Evil Options and Agent-Centred Options", DPhil Seminar in Philosophy, University of Oxford (Nov 2022)

(14) "Objecting to Defensive Intervention", Austin Graduate Ethics and Normativity Talks, University of Texas at Austin (Nov 2022)

(13) "Objecting to Third-Party Intervention", comments by Jonathan Parry, Graduate and Early Career Reading Retreat, Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace (Jun 2022)

(12) "Objecting to Third-Party Intervention", Workshop in Practical Philosophy, Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics (Jun 2022)

(11) "The Act/Sequence Puzzle of Abortion: Disaggregating, Bundling, and Moral Necessity", comments by Alida Liberman, NYU Philosophical Bioethics Workshop, NYU Centre for Bioethics (Apr 2022) ***Graduate Student Prize Winner***

(10) "The Act/Sequence Puzzle of Abortion: Disaggregating and Moral Necessity", Annual Graduate Conference, New Orleans Philosophical Society (Mar 2022)

(9) "The Beneficiary Principle and Humanitarian Intervention", International Conference, Association for Practical and Professional Ethics (Feb 2022)

(8) "Solving the Abortion Paradox: Disaggregating, Bundling, and Sequences", comments by Krister Bykvist, Stockholm Graduate Conference in Philosophy, Stockholm University (Dec 2021)

(7) "Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle", Zagreb Applied Ethics Conference (Sep 2021)

(6) "Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle", comments by Dmitry Ananyev, Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, University of Colorado at Boulder (Aug 2021)

(5) "Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle", Annual Conference, Australasian Association of Philosophy (Jul 2021)

(4) "Responsibility and the Moral Significance of Intervening Agency", Joint Session, Aristotelian Society and Mind Association (Jul 2021)

(3) "Harmless Torturer and Liability: A Puzzle", Ockham Society, University of Oxford (Jun 2021)

(2) "Responsibility and the Moral Significance of Intervening Agency", comments by Clay Alsup, Annual Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Apr 2021)

(1) "Responsibility and the Moral Significance of Intervening Agency", comments by Megan Kitts, Annual Rocky Mountain Philosophy Conference, University of Colorado at Boulder (Apr 2021)

Comments

(5) Comments on "Guarantees of Non-Repetition & the Case for a Pluralist Framework of Reparative Justice" by Sibylle Léonard, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Jun 2026)

(4) Comments on "Two Puzzles About Proportionate Deterrence" by Helen Frowe, Conference – Just Philosophy: A Tribute to Jeff McMahan (Jun 2025)

(3) Comments on *Violence in Proportion* by Patrick Tomlin, Manuscript Workshop, University of Warwick (Sep 2023)

(2) Comments on "Deception and Social Rights" by Charlie Richards, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (May 2023)

(1) Comments on "Political Liberalism: Neutrality or Consent" by Simeon Goldstraw, Work-in-Progress in Political Theory Seminar, University of Oxford (Oct 2022)

6. TEACHING

Undergraduate Tutorials, Oxford

(5) TT24 (Apr 2024 – Jun 2024)

- Moral Philosophy (Prelim) – 13 students
- Practical Ethics (Final) – 1 student
- Theory of Politics (Final) – 1 student

(4) HT24 (Jan 2024 – Mar 2024)

- Ethics (Final) – 6 students
- Practical Ethics (Final) – 2 students
- Theory of Politics (Final) – 1 student

(3) MT23 (Oct 2023 – Dec 2023)

- Ethics (Final) – 7 students
- Practical Ethics (Final) – 3 students

(2) TT23 (Apr 2023 – Jun 2023)

- Ethics (Final) – 4 students
- Practical Ethics (Final) – 3 students
- Theory of Politics (Prelim) – 13 students

(1) HT23 (Jan 2023 – Mar 2023)

- Ethics (Final) – 4 students

Undergraduate Revision Classes, Oxford

(2) TT24 (Apr 2024 – Jun 2024)

- Ethics (Final) – 16 students
- Practical Ethics (Final) – 7 students

(1) TT23 (Apr 2023 – Jun 2023)

- Ethics (Final) – 4 students
- Moral Philosophy (Prelim) – 10 students
- Theory of Politics (Prelim) – 13 students

Undergraduate Collection Marking, Oxford

(4) TT24 (Apr 2024 – Jun 2024)

- Ethics (Final) – 6 scripts
- Theory of Politics (Final) – 1 script

(3) HT24 (Jan 2024 – Mar 2024)

- Ethics (Final) – 2 scripts
- Practical Ethics (Final) – 2 scripts

(2) MT23 (Oct 2023 – Dec 2023)

- Ethics (Final) – 2 scripts

(1) TT23 (Apr 2023 – Jun 2023)

- Ethics (Final) – 8 scripts
- Knowledge and Reality (Final) – 1 script
- Practical Ethics (Final) – 1 script

7. SERVICE

Editorial Positions

- Co-editor, Public Philosophy Section, PEA Soup, https://peasoupblog.com/ (May 2023 – present)

Refereeing

(3) 2026: *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*

(2) 2024: *The Philosophical Quarterly; Ergo*

(1) 2023: *Journal of Moral Philosophy*

Index Preparation

(4) *Violence in Proportion*, Patrick Tomlin, Oxford University Press, 2025
(May 2025 – Jun 2025)

(3) *Derek Parfit: His Life and Thought*, edited by Jeff McMahan, Oxford University Press, 2025
(Mar 2025)

(2) *Ethics and Existence: The Legacy of Derek Parfit*, edited by Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan, Oxford University Press, 2022
(Sep 2021 – Oct 2021)

(1) *Principles and Persons: The Legacy of Derek Parfit*, edited by Jeff McMahan, Tim Campbell, James Goodrich, and Ketan Ramakrishnan, Oxford University Press, 2021 (Feb 2021 – Mar 2021)

Administration

- Undergraduate Admissions Interviewer, Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford (Dec 2023)

Educational Outreach

- Founder and CEO, Inquiry Academy (求思学社), https://www.inquiry-academy.com/ (Feb 2026 – present)

8. SELECT AWARDS

(4) DPhil Funding, Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK) and Corpus Christi College, Oxford (Oct 2022 – Dec 2025)

(3) Honours Scholarship, Australian National University (Feb 2019 – Oct 2019)

(2) Lithgow Scholarship, University of Sydney (Apr 2018)

(1) Francis E Snare Memorial Prize, University of Sydney (Apr 2018)